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Abstract: The U.S. states have been characterized as “laboratories of democracy” for
their ability to formulate public policies aimed at solving some of the most pressing
public policy issues. The study of both public policy and legislative politics in the states
has been quite robust. However, vitally missing from our understanding of policymaking
and the legislative process in the states is the role of constitutional provisions. Many state
constitutions contain directives that severely limit the ability of the legislature to act.
Some of these directives are procedural while others are more substantive. This is
relevant because constitutional rules are more difficult for members to alter than chamber
rules and should lead us to question whether or not reform is needed. In previous
research (Martorano Miller, Hamm and Hedlund 2009; 2010; 2011; 2014a; 2014b) we
developed a quantitative measure of constitutional restrictiveness and explored current
variation in this measure across the fifty state legislatures and the U.S. Congress. In this
paper, we seek to expand upon our previous research by assessing provisions found in
each state’s constitution in terms of the historical context surrounding the constitution’s
adoption. We find that this “setting” has a significant impact on the constitutional
provisions regarding the legislature’s powers restrictions and mandates. These features in
turn create the “constraints” (a type of “cage”) limiting the legislature.

Paper prepared for presentation at the 2015 meeting of the State Politics and Policy
Conference, California State University – Sacramento, May 29-30.
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Constitutions have long been of interest to legal scholars. The bulk of this
research has focused on the U.S. Constitution as well as the comparison of the U.S.
Constitution to the constitutions of other nations. Legal scholars have given far less
attention to the constitutions of the U.S. states and political scientists have given them
even less attention. To our knowledge, there has been no systematic attempt to study
state constitutions and their impact on policy-making and politics in the states. This lack
of attention is interesting given that some scholars have long acknowledged the important
role of a state’s constitutional document. Daniel Elazar writes:
“Thus, the states remain significant determinants of the quality of life of the
American people. The way in which each state frames and allocates powers
through its constitution reflects certain conceptions of government and
understandings of the two faces of politics – power and justice. That is, state
constitutions are important determinants of who gets what, when and how in
America because they are conceptual and at times, very specific statements of
who should get what, when and how (Elazar 1982: 17).”
State constitutions also differ from our federal constitution in the manner in which
legislative power was originally perceived. The U.S. Constitution clearly delineates the
Congress’ legislative powers in Article I, Section 1 and limits the Congress to only those
“legislative Powers herein granted.” The Tenth Amendment further limits the federal
government by granting the states the power not delegated to the federal government or
prohibited to the states. Given the relative brevity of the national document, this granted
substantial, non-delineated power to the state governments. The constitutions adopted by
the states reflected the vast nature of what was left unwritten in the federal Constitution
and largely conceived of state government power as plenary and granted significant
plenary powers to the legislative branch in particular (Tarr 1998; Elazar 1982). Tarr
explains,
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“…state governments have historically been understood to possess plenary
legislative powers – that is, those residual legislative powers not ceded to the
national government or prohibited to them by the federal Constitution. As the
Kansas Supreme Court has observed: ‘When the constitutionality of a statute is
involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether the act is authorized by
the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby (Tarr 1998: 7).’”
Elazar also writing about the plenary nature of state governments explains that in
comparison to the U.S. Constitution, the state constitutions need to be more
comprehensive and explicit about limiting and defining the scope of governmental
powers to prevent their growth and expansion (Elazar 1982).
Scholarship on state constitutions often focuses on illustrating through examples
the great variability that exists across the states in their constitutional documents (Tarr
1998; 2014; Williams 2009). The most prolific of these scholars is G. Alan Tarr, who in
a recent article describes the great flexibility that the federal government gave to the
states by noting:
“If one compares the "constitutional space" available to state constitution-makers
in the United States with that available to their counterparts in other federations,
there are far greater opportunities for constitutional innovation and
experimentation in the United States than in most other federations (Tarr 2014:
2).”
He further goes on to discuss in general terms how the states have used this
“power” to innovate and experiment – by citing the fact that the 50 states have adopted
145 constitutions and the current state constitutions have been amended over 10,0000
times (Tarr 2014). Tarr’s assertions regarding the great diversity in state constitutions is
shared by John Dinan (2009) who believes that historically the states have been better at
revisiting their constitutions and revising their institutions and governing principles based
on past experiences or fundamental shifts in culture, etc., and thus have allowed state
governments to evolve in ways that make them more responsive to modern problems.
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Tarr (2014) also asserts that the ways in which the states have chosen to alter their
constitutional documents differ significantly from the ways in which our little-changed
federal constitution has been altered. In particular, he points to the many provisions in
state constitutions that are directed towards the state’s legislative branch. Our past
research (Martorano Miller, Hamm and Hedlund, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014a; 2014b)
has focused on identifying and assessing in a systematic manner these provisions in
current state constitutions that impact the legislative process. In this paper, our goal is to
explore the extent to which a state’s original constitution reflects the context in which the
constitution was written/adopted and informed the legislative process.

Powers, Mandates, Restrictions and Constitutional Restrictiveness
Most of the studies of state constitutions conducted by legal scholars have focused
on a single aspect of state constitutional law or on a deep understanding of the
constitutional evolution of a single state.1 There are a handful of political science studies
of state constitutions. However, these studies have focused largely on generalizations and
descriptions of periods of state constitutional development (Elazar 1982; Sturm 1982;
Tarr 1998; Kincaid 2014) and not on a constitution’s development and evolution.
As far as we know, there have been no systematic attempts to study the content of
state constitutions in a comparative context. Our most recent research endeavors have
aimed to rectify this gap in our understanding of how the constitutional document might
influence the state legislature and ultimately the adoption of public policy. This past
research has focused on constitutional provisions that currently affect legislative
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

"In"the"Oxford"Commentaries"on"the"State"Constitutions"of"the"United"States"series,"each"state’s"
constitutional"history"is"given"an"in=depth"book=length"treatment."
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processes and procedures (Martorano Miller, Hamm and Hedlund 2009; 2010; 2011;
2013; 2014a; 2014b).
As that research has evolved we began to view constitutional provisions as
creating a cage within which the legislature must operate. We chose the cage metaphor,
since these provisions have been determined external to the body and create boundaries
for legislative action. We also have taken the lead of Tarr (1998) and have begun to think
of these provisions as impacting the legislature in three distinct ways; a provision either
grants the legislature a power, mandates that the legislature act or restricts the legislature
from acting (Martorano Miller, Hamm and Hedlund 2014b). In our view mandates and
restrictions are complementary in that both limit the “free will” of the legislative body by
either forcing it to act or preventing it from acting. Using these three types of provisions,
we have created and measured the concept of constitutional restrictiveness.
Constitutional restrictiveness is the number of powers found in the constitution minus the
mandates plus restrictions – (Powers – (Mandates+Restrictions)). We found that in some
states, the cage of operation is quite small – meaning that mandates and restrictions far
outnumber powers, while in others the cage is significantly larger where there is either
more parity in the number of powers versus mandates and restrictions or more powers
relative to mandates and restrictions. This research also found that that adopted their
current constitution most recently are also more likely than states with older constitutions
to restrict their legislatures by adopting more mandates and restrictions than powers
(Martorano Miller, Hamm and Hedlund 2014b).
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Research Design
The analysis in this paper replicates our earlier analysis of constitutional
provisions (Martorano Miller, Hamm and Hedlund 2014b) by focusing on a state’s
original constitution rather than on its current document. Just as in the previous paper,
we are focusing only on those provisions that impact the structures and procedures via
which the legislative bodies consider and pass legislation. One author read the legislative
article of each original state constitution, and the relevant provisions were recorded and
coded as a power, mandate or restriction. The coding author conferred with the other two
authors in cases when interpretation and coding of a provision was unclear.2 We coded a
provision a power if it provides the legislature the ability to act at its discretion.
Provisions that state that the legislature “may” or “can” act are treated as powers. In
contrast, provisions that state that the legislature “will” or “shall” act are considered
mandates. Finally, provisions that state that the legislature “may not,” “must not” or
“shall not” are treated as restrictions.
The analysis in this paper is largely descriptive and establishes the baseline by
which to begin an analysis of how constitutional provisions have evolved over time.
However, we will also explore the extent to which the historical time period in which the
original constitution was adopted may impact the content of original constitutions as well
as provide a cursory comparison of the current state constitutions to the state’s original
document.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

"Appendix"A"contains"a"chart"that"lists"the"year"of"adoption"for"each"state’s"original"constitution."For"all"
but" one" (CT)" of" the" 13" original" colonies," the" adoption" of" the" original" state" constitution" is" prior" to" the"
adoption"of"the"federal"constitution"and"these"documents"–"especially"those"from"1776"or"1777"are"much"
closer"to"colonial"charters"in"nature"rather"than"constitutions"as"we"think"of"them.""We"include"the"federal"
constitution"in"our"analysis"and"treat"it"as"equal"to"the"other"50"states."
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Historical Patterns and the Constitutional Nature of Legislative Provisions
The context created by the historical time period in which a state adopted its
original constitution appears to be a significant determinant regarding the extent to which
the legislative process is guided by constitutional directives. A number of scholars have
addressed the historical development of state constitutions (Elazar 1982; Sturm 1982;
Kincaid 2014), and assert that the political, social and economic context of a time period
impacts how these documents evolve. In our study, we adopt the historical time periods
used by Albert Sturm (1982).

He identifies five periods of state constitutional

development:
1. The First State Constitutions (1776-1780) – These constitutions were marked
by the establishment of strong legislatures with significant plenary powers.
The new states experience with colonialism under British rule left them
distrustful of executive power and the legislative branch benefitted.
2. Early 19th Century Developments (1800-1860): This period marked the rise of
Jacksonian Democracy. It coupled with public discontent with legislative
corruption3 led to the diminishment of legislative power and the strengthening
of the governor.
3. Civil War, Reconstruction and Its Aftermath (1860-1900): The influences of
the Civil War and Reconstruction led to additional constitutional limitations
on the legislative branch in the states
4. Beginnings of Reform (1900-1950) – Further limitations on legislatures were
adopted in this period as the result of revelations of corruption in public
agencies and the Progressive Movement push for more public control of
government.
5. Post-1950 – Events like mandatory reapportionment and reform movements
that aimed to enhance the capacity of states to govern led to efforts to
strengthen the legislative branch.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

"The"public"became"disturbed"by"legislative"enactment"of"excessive"special"legislation"for"the"benefit"of"
private"or"sectional"interests"
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Sturm makes a very compelling argument for the role that history and historical context
plays in the development of constitutional traditions. It is clear that the political forces
and events of the day likely had a significant impact on the choices made by those
designing original state constitutions or determining the changes needed to an existing
constitution.

This notion that the starting point and subsequent choices regarding

institutions are connected is not new.

Many scholars have asserted that political

institutions and processes are by their nature path dependent and that any attempt to
account for phenomenon associated with these institutions and processes must take this
path dependency into account (Pierson 2000a, 2000b; Jervis 2000; Thelen 2000; Bridges
2000). Comparative politics scholars studying democratization and the adoption of other
governing institutions as well as scholars studying American political development have
long acknowledged the importance of path dependency in their work (e.g., Lipset and
Rokkan 1967; North 1990; Schickler 2001; Skocpol 1992; Collier and Collier 1991;
Ertman 1996; Hacker 1998).
Figure 1 looks at the mean number of total provisions found in original state
constitutions by the historical era they were adopted.4 The later an original document
was adopted, the greater the number of provisions informing the legislative process. In
states that adopted pre-1800, the average number of provisions was nine. The mean
number of provisions increases by 78 percent to 16 for states that adopted their original
constitutions between 1800 and 1859. Relative to pre-1800, states that adopted between
1860 and 1899 experienced a 167 percent increases in provisions with an average of 24.
States that adopted original constitutions during the height of the Progressive Era (1900!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

"States"are"not"evenly"distributed"across"the"five"historical"eras.""The"number"of"states"adopting"their"
original"constitutions"in"each"era"are:"1)"Pre=1800=15;"2)"1800=1859=20;"3)"1860=1899=11;"4)"1900=
1949=3;"and"Post=1950=2."
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1949) experienced the largest growth in mean provisions (233 percent) relative to the pre1800 era with an average of 30 provisions. In the two states that are part of the post-1950
era, there is a small drop (to 25) in the mean provisions found. Table 1A presents the
mean differences in total provisions across the five historical periods as well as the results
of difference of means tests.

Almost all of the mean differences are statistically

significant indicating that the historical time period can partially account for differences
in the total number of provisions in a constitution that inform the legislative process.
[Figure 1 and Table 1A about here]
Earlier we indicated that not all provisions are necessarily created equal. Rather,
some provisions bestow power to the legislature over the legislative process, while others
mandate or restrict legislative action.

Do similar patterns emerge regarding the

connection between era of constitutional adoption and mean numbers of powers,
mandates and restrictions? Figure 2 displays three clusters of bar graphs – one for
powers, one for mandates and one for restrictions. The bars represent the historical time
periods.

Overall the general pattern is for later constitutions to contain more of

everything. In particular, the pattern is to include more mandates and restrictions rather
than powers, although the mean number of powers present doubles by the post-1950
period versus the pre-1800 period. However, the rate of change is much greater for
mandates and restrictions. Relative to pre-1800, the mean number of mandates increases
by 200 percent (to 6) for constitutions adopted during 1800-1859 and 450 percent (to 11)
for those adopted during 1860-1900 and 1900-1949. A similar pattern of change holds
for restrictive provisions. Difference of means testing also confirm the patterns seen in
Figure 2 (see Tables 1B, 1C and 1D). Figure 3 presents the distribution of the different

!

8!

!
types of provisions by time period – clearly over time, the trend has been to reduce grants
of power to the legislature and include a greater number of mandates and restrictions. In
states that adopted constitutions pre-1800, on average about 54 percent of the provisions
granted the legislature power. In states that adopted their original constitutions between
1860-1899 and 1900-1949 that average drops to about 25 percent.
[Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 1B, 1C and 1D about here]
Tarr (1998) makes the assertion, and we agree, that mandates and restrictions are
similar in their consequences for the legislature – both limit the legislature by either
requiring the body to act regardless of if it wants to or not (mandates) or by preventing
the body from action, even if it seeks to do so (restrictions). The averages displayed in
Figure 4 show the growth in mandates and restrictions combined over the course of the
five historical eras. The period of greatest growth was during the 1900-1949 time period,
in which constitutions adopted during this stretch contained on average 22 mandates and
restrictions, a 450 percent increase from the average of 4 mandates and restrictions found
in the pre-1800 constitutions. The difference of means testing in Table 1E further
confirms this dramatic rate of growth.
[Figure 4 and Table 1E about here]
Considering each of these types of provisions in isolation makes it difficult to
consider how the legislative process may be impacted by their presence. Rather, we need
to consider each of these types in their totality. To achieve this we calculated a
constitutional restrictiveness score discussed earlier by subtracting from a state
legislature’s constitutional powers, the combined number of mandates and restrictions
found in the constitution. Figure 5 presents the mean constitutional restrictiveness score
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for the original constitutions adopted during each of the eras. The averages are pretty
dramatic.

In only one period (pre-1800) did the number of powers outnumber the

number the mandates and restrictions.

During the 1900-1949 period the average

increases to -15, a 4,445 percent increase from pre-1800. The transition to mandates and
restrictions outnumbering powers is not unexpected during this period given the influence
of the Progressive Movement, which called for more transparency and openness in
government. It is not surprising that states that were joining the United States during this
period included many provisions that aimed to achieve these goals – such as the adoption
of the initiative and referendum, open meeting provisions, and requirements regarding
bill reading and committee referrals. The difference of means test in Table 1F confirm
that these increases were statistically significant.
[Figure 5 and Table 1F about here]
!
Stickiness of Constitutional Provisions
Our focus on the content of the early constitutions extends beyond a simple
cataloguing of the specific provisions..

Our main concern is to ascertain the extent to

which the provisions found in a state's earliest constitution are still part of the current
document.

In other words, how sticky are the original powers, mandates, and

restrictions? Which provisions were most likely to be removed? Finally, what states
were most or least likely to remove these original provisions? Do they vary by the time
period in which they were adopted?
To answer these questions, we compared the legislative provisions in the oldest
and current constitution. All told, there were 846 individual powers, mandates and
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restrictions dealing with the legislative process in the 51 original constitutions, including
the U.S. Constitution. Comparing the earliest with them most recent constitution in each
state, we found that 110 of the original provisions, or 13.0%, are not part of current
documents.
The first unanticipated finding is that the excised provisions do not deal mainly
with legislative powers. Powers and mandates each account for roughly 39% of the
deleted provisions while the remaining 22% are made up of legislative restrictions. The
surprise is that a majority of the deleted provisions are not isolated events. They occur in
more than one state. In fact, over one-half of the deleted provisions relate to just eight
topics. In terms of legislative powers, six states deleted provisions that dealt with the all
powers necessary for a branch of the legislature of a free and independent state. This
language, while appropriate in early colonial times or when a territory is being admitted
to the union, seemed unnecessary as time elapsed. Five states altered the provision
regarding the chamber closing sessions if the matter requires secrecy. Six deleted
provisions related to who may call a special session and the content of the bills discussed
during that period.
A major change focused on appropriations. In fact, 10 states changed the
mandate language dealing with money being drawn from treasury by bill only or
appropriation by bill only. Another frequent change (N=9) involves revenue bills. Four
states dropped the mandate that revenue bills must originate in the house while five states
dispensed with senate power to alter or reject revenue bills from the house. This latter
development will require more intensive analysis to see why this change was made.
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The provision that is most deleted from the current constitutions (N=11) relates to
the timing of the reading of each bill. Four states dispensed with the requirement that
bills must be read on a specific number of different days while seven states modified the
requirement that the majority can advance a bill from second to third reading on the same
day. Six states deleted the restriction that a quorum must involve the presence of twothirds of the membership. Obviously, this power was not eliminated but simply modified.
Do constitutional provisions develop more or less stickiness depending on the
time period in which the original document was adopted?

Figure 6 makes a brief

comparison of a state’s original constitution to its current constitution. The three bar
graphs depict the percentage of powers, mandates, and restrictions, respectively, that are
exactly the same between the original and current constitutions. The percentages are
quite high for all three types of provisions. This infers that generally once a provision is
entered into a constitution, the likelihood that it will be significantly modified or removed
is fairly rare and provides additional empirical support to notion that institutions exhibit a
certain degree of stickiness (Schickler 2001) and once adopted a path has been set upon
that “travellers” are reluctant to veer too far off. The only real difference across the time
periods involves mandates and restrictions found in states with the earliest constitutions.
They are less likely to have survived in the current constitutions.
[Figure 6 about here]
!!!!!!!!!!!!! Figure! 6,! however,! masks! some! of! the! variation! that! does! exist! among! the!
states.!For!example,!nine!states!account!for!55!of!deleted!provisions,!or!50%!of!the!
total! exclusions,! with! just! four! states! (i.e,! Montana,! Illinois,! Nebraska! and! North!
Dakota)!!having!30!of!the!deleted!provisions.!On!the!other!hand,!eight!states!and!the!
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United!States,!did!not!have!any!change!in!the!original!provisions!over!time.!!While!
they!may!have!added!powers,!mandates!and!provisions,!they!did!not!remove!any!of!
the!original!elements.!!!

Discussion and Conclusions
Far too often when we consider the legislative bodies, we wash over the role that
time and history have played in determining the process via which these bodies conduct
their work. Rather, an implicit assumption exists that the rules and processes employed
by state legislative bodies are changed as necessary depended upon the incentives and
needs of the members at any given point in time.

The analysis of original state

constitutions and their comparison to current constitutions in this paper underscores the
important role that history plays in determining how legislatures consider and adopt
legislation. It also must make us appreciate the important role of institutions that are
external to legislative bodies.
In this paper, we found that original state constitutions exhibit a significant degree
in variation with regards to provisions that grant legislatures power, mandate they act or
restrict them from activity. Further, in a basic, but robust analysis we find that the
historical time period in which a state’s original constitution was adopted was
meaningful. Specifically, original constitutions adopted during the early years of the
republic had fewer provisions overall and were more likely to favor grants of power over
mandates and restrictions. Original constitutions adopted during later historical periods
contained more provisions, and were more likely to favor limiting legislative action
through mandates and restrictions rather than granting specific powers. Overall, state
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constitutions are more inclined to include a set of provisions that restricts/limits
legislative action rather than empower it, evidenced by constitutional restrictiveness
scores that average mostly in the negative.
Finally, we found that there is a certain degree of stickiness between a state’s
original constitution and its current constitution.

More often than not, provisions

regarding the legislative process included in the original constitution are still present.
Further, the vast majority of the differences between original and current constitutions is
found in just a handful of states.
The analysis in this paper is a small component of a larger study that seeks to
systematically study the impact of constitutional content on a state’s legislative branch.
This paper has advanced our study by providing the initial baseline of powers, mandates,
restrictions, and constitutional restrictiveness in the states. In future papers, we plan to
test a series of hypotheses using pooled time series data that tracks each change to the
constitution in each state from entry into the union until present with the goal of
specifying a more exact model of constitutional restrictiveness on state legislative
activity.
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Appendix A: Year of Original Constitution Adoption
(States are in order of year of adoption)
State%
Delaware"
Maryland"
New"Hampshire"
New"Jersey"
North"Carolina"
Pennsylvania"
South"Carolina"
Virginia"
Georgia"
New"York"
Vermont"
Massachusetts"
United"States"
Kentucky"
Tennessee"
Ohio"
Louisiana"
Indiana"
Mississippi"
Connecticut"
Illinois"
Alabama"
Maine"
Missouri"
Michigan"
Arkansas"

!

Year%Original%Adopted%
1776"
1776"
1776"
1776"
1776"
1776"
1776"
1776"
1777"
1777"
1777"
1780"
1787"
1792"
1796"
1802"
1812"
1816"
1817"
1818"
1818"
1819"
1819"
1820"
1835"
1836"

State%
Florida"
Rhode"island"
Texas"
Iowa"
Wisconsin"
California"
Minnesota"
Oregon"
Kansas"
West"Virginia"
Nevada"
Nebraska"
Colorado"
Idaho"
Montana"
North"Dakota"
South"Dakota"
Washington"
Wyoming"
Utah"
Oklahoma"
Arizona"
New"Mexico"
Hawaii"
Alaska"
"

Year%Original%Adopted%
1839"
1842"
1845"
1846"
1848"
1849"
1857"
1857"
1859"
1863"
1864"
1866"
1876"
1889"
1889"
1889"
1889"
1889"
1889"
1895"
1907"
1911"
1911"
1950"
1956"
"
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Figure'2'

Mean'Powers,'Mandates'and'Restrictions'found'in'Original'State'
Constitutions'
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Figure!3!
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Figure!3,!Cont’d!
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Figure'4'

Mean'Number'of'Mandates'+'Restrictions'in'Original'Constitutions'
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Figure'5'

Mean'Constitutional'Restrictiveness'in'Original'State'
Constitutions'
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Figure 6

Mean!%!Powers!that!are!the!Same!in!both!
Original!and!Current!State!Constitutions!
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Mean!%!Restrictions!that!are!the!Same!in!both!
Original!and!Current!State!Constitutions!
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Table!1!
Difference!of!Means!Testing!in!Original!Constitutional!Provisions!
!
!
A)!Total!Provisions!

!
Pre$1800(
1800$1859(
1860$1899(
1900$1949(
Post$1950(

Pre$1800(
!
7.11***(
14.81***(
20.93***(
16.27***(

1800$1859(
!
(
7.70***(
13.82***(
9.15**(

1860$1899(
!
!
!
6.12*(
1.45!

1900$1949(
!
!
!
!
&4.67!

1860$1899(
!
!
!
1.06!
3.23*(

1900$1949(
!
!
!
!
2.17!

1860$1899(
!
!
!
&.09!
&3.59!

1900$1949(
!
!
!
!
&3.50!

Cell!entries!are!mean!differences.!*p<.05,!**p<.01,!***p<.001!
!

!
!
B)!Powers!
!

!
Pre$1800(
1800$1859(
1860$1899(
1900$1949(
Post$1950(

Pre$1800(
!
2.77***(
1.74*(
2.8*(
4.97***(

1800$1859(
!
(
&1.03!
.03!
2.20!

!Cell!entries!are!mean!differences.!*p<.05,!**p<.01,!***p<.001!
!
!
!

C)!Mandates!

!

!
Pre$1800(
1800$1859(
1860$1899(
1900$1949(
Post$1950(

Pre$1800(
!
3.72***(
8.76***(
8.67***(
5.17*(

1800$1859(
!
(
5.04***(
4.95**(
1.45!

Cell!entries!are!mean!differences.!*p<.05,!**p<.01,!***p<.001!
!
!

!
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!
!
Table!1,!cont’d!

!

D)!Restrictions!

!

!
Pre$1800(
1800$1859(
1860$1899(
1900$1949(
Post$1950(

Pre$1800(
!
.633!
4.32***(
9.47***(
6.13***(

1800$1859(
!
(
3.68***(
8.83***(
5.50***(

1860$1899(
!
!
!
5.15***(
1.82!

1900$1949(
!
!
!
!
&3.33!

Cell!entries!are!mean!differences.!*p<.05,!**p<.01,!***p<.001!
!
!
!

E)!Mandates!+!Restrictions!

!

!
Pre$1800(
1800$1859(
1860$1899(
1900$1949(
Post$1950(

Pre$1800(
!
4.35***(
13.07***(
18.13***(
11.30***(

1800$1859(
!
(
8.72***(
13.78***(
6.95*(

1860$1899(
!
!
!
5.06*(
&1.77!

1900$1949(
!
!
!
!
$6.83*(

Cell!entries!are!mean!differences.!*p<.05,!**p<.01,!***p<.001!
!

!
!
F)!Constitutional!Restrictiveness!

!

!
Pre$1800(
1800$1859(
1860$1899(
1900$1949(
Post$1950(

Pre$1800(
!
&1.58!
$11.33***(
$15.33***(
$6.33*(

1800$1859(
!
(
$9.75***(
$13.75***(
&4.75!

1860$1899(
!
!
!
&4.00!
5.00!

1900$1949(
!
!
!
!
9.00*(

Cell!entries!are!mean!differences.!*p<.05,!**p<.01,!***p<.001!
!

!

!

!
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